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Optimal Beamforming for Gaussian MIMO Wiretap
Channels with Two Transmit Antennas
Mojtaba Vaezi, Wonjae Shin, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—A Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output wiretap
channel in which the eavesdropper and legitimate receiver are
equipped with arbitrary numbers of antennas and the transmitter
has two antennas is studied in this paper. Under an average power
constraint, the optimal input covariance to obtain the secrecy
capacity of this channel is unknown, in general. In this paper,
the input covariance matrix required to achieve the capacity is
determined. It is shown that the secrecy capacity of this channel
can be achieved by linear precoding. The optimal precoding and
power allocation schemes that maximize the achievable secrecy
rate, and thus achieve the capacity, are developed subsequently.
The secrecy capacity is then compared with the achievable secrecy
rate of generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based
precoding, which is the best previously proposed technique for
this problem. Numerical results demonstrate that substantial gain
can be obtained in secrecy rate between the proposed and GSVD-
based precodings.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, MIMO wiretap channel,
secrecy rate, beamforming, linear precoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become an indispensable part of our
daily life and security/privacy of information transfer via these
networks is crucial. Unfortunately, wireless communication
systems are inherently insecure due to the broadcast nature of
the medium. Hence, wireless security has been an important
concern for many years. Traditionally, security is provided
at the upper layers of wireless networks via cryptographic
techniques, wherein the legitimate user has a secret key to
decode its message. Security can be also offered at the lowest
layer (physical layer), e.g., via beamforming or artificial noise
injection [2], to support and supplement existing cryptographic
protocols.
Physical layer security has attracted widespread attention as
a means of augmenting wireless security [2]. Physical layer
security is based on the information theoretic secrecy that can
be provided by physical communication channels, an idea that
was first proposed by Wyner [3], in the context of the wiretap
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Fig. 1. MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with nt, nr , and ne antennas, at
the transmitter (Alice), legitimate receiver (Bob), and eavesdropper (Eve).
channel. In this channel, a transmitter wishes to transmit infor-
mation to a legitimate receiver while keeping the information
secure from an eavesdropper. Wyner demonstrated that it
is possible to have both reliable and secure communication
between the transmitter and legitimate receiver in the presence
of an eavesdropper under certain circumstances. The basic
principal is that the channel of the legitimate receiver should
be stronger in some sense than that of the eavesdropper.
With the rapid advancement of multi-antenna techniques, se-
curity enhancement in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
wiretap channels, see Fig. 1, has drawn significant attention.
A big step toward understanding the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel was taken in [4]–[6] where a closed-form expression
for the capacity of this channel was established. However,
to compute this expression, the input covariance matrix that
maximizes it needs to be determined. Under an average power
constraint, such a matrix is unknown in general.1 Recently,
numerical solutions have been proposed to compute a transmit
covariance matrix for this channel [8]–[10]. These numeri-
cal approaches solve the underlying non-convex optimization
problem iteratively. Despite their efficiency, there is still moti-
vation to find an analytical solution for this problem and study
simpler techniques for secure communication, e.g., based on
linear precoding.
Precoding is a technique for exploiting transmit diversity via
weighting the information stream. Singular value decomposi-
1Under a power-covariance constraint, the capacity expression and corre-
sponding covariance matrix is found in [6] and [7], respectively.
2tion (SVD) precoding with water-filling power allocation is a
well-known example that achieves the capacity of the MIMO
channel. Khisti and Wornell [4] proposed a generalized SVD
(GSVD)-based precoding scheme with equal power allocation
for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. The optimal power
allocation scheme for GSVD precoding in the MIMO Gaussian
wiretap channel was obtained in [11]. Although GSVD precod-
ing gets close to the capacity in certain antenna configurations,
it is neither capacity-achieving nor very close to capacity, in
general. Despite its importance and years of research, optimal
transmit/receive strategies to maximize the secure rate in
MIMO wiretap channels remain unknown, in general. Linear
beamforming transmission has, however, been proved to be
optimal for the special case of nt = 2, nr = 2, and ne = 1 in
[12]. It is also known to be the optimal communication strategy
for multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channels [13],
[14].
Recently, a closed-form solution for the optimal covariance
matrix has been found when the channel is strictly degraded
and another condition on the channel matrices, which is
equivalent to a lower threshold on the transmitted power, holds
[15]–[17]. The combination of this result and the unit-rank
solution of [14] can give the optimal covariance matrix for
the case of two transmit antennas [17]. The optimal solution
is, however, still open in general.
In this paper, we characterize optimal precoding and power
allocation for MIMO Gaussian wiretap channels in which the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper have arbitrary numbers
of antennas but the transmitter has two antennas. This proves
that linear beamforming transmission can be optimal for a
much broader class of MIMO Gaussian wiretap channels.
Our approach in finding the optimal covariance matrix is
completely different from that of [16] and [17]. It does not
require the degradedness condition and thus provides the
optimal solution for both full-rank and rank-deficient cases
in one shot. The proposed beamforming and power allocation
schemes result in a computable capacity with a reasonably
low complexity. It requires searching over two scalars (power
allocation) at most. In addition, the proposed beamforming
and power allocation schemes can bring notably high gain
over GSVD-based beamforming, as confirmed by simulation
results.
It is worth highlighting that the new precoding and power
allocation techniques are applicable to and optimal for MIMO
channels without secrecy, simply by setting the eavesdroppers
channel to zero. In such cases, power allocation is even simpler
and does not require a search.
Secure transmission strategies in multi-antenna networks
with various constraints and/or in different settings, e.g., with
energy-efficiency [18], finite memory [19], joint source-relay
precoding [20], game-theoretic precoding [21], and varying
eavesdropper channel states [22] have been considered re-
cently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model. In Section III, we reformulate
the secrecy rate problem and propose linear precoding and
power allocation schemes to achieve the capacity of the
MIMO/MISO wiretap channels. In Section IV, we show that
the proposed precoding and power allocation schemes are also
optimal for MIMO/MISO channels without an eavesdropper
and we discuss possible extensions of the proposed precoding
method. We present numerical results in Section V before
concluding the paper in Section VI.
Throughout this work, we use notations tr(·), det(·), (·)t,
and (·)H to denote the trace, determinant, transpose, and
conjugate transpose of a matrix, respectively. Matrices are
written in bold capital letters and vectors are written in bold
small letters. A  0 means that A is a positive semidefinite
matrix, and Im represents the identity matrix of size m.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel, in which a
transmitter (Alice) wishes to communicate with a legitimate
receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve), as
shown in Fig. 1. The nodes are equipped with nt, nr, and ne
antennas, respectively. Let H ∈ Rnr×nt and G ∈ Rne×nt be
the channel matrices for the legitimate user and eavesdropper.
Both channels are assumed to undergo independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh fading, where the channel
gains are real Gaussian random variables.2 The received signal
at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper are, respectively,
given by
yr = Hx + wr, (1a)
ye =Gx + we, (1b)
in which x ∈ Rnt×1 is the transmitted signal and wi ∈ Rni×1,
i ∈ {r, e}, represents an i.i.d. Gaussian noise vector with zero
mean and identity covariance matrix. As will be seen later, x =
Vs where V ∈ Rnt×nt is the precoding matrix to transmit a
secrete data symbol vector s. The transmitted signal is subject
to an average power constraint
tr(E{xxt}) = tr(Q) ≤ P,
where P is a scalar, and Q = E{xxt} is the input covariance
matrix.
A single-letter expression for the secrecy capacity of the
general discrete memoryless wiretap channel with transition
probability p(yr, ye|x) is given by [24]
Cs = max
p(u,x)
[
I(U ;Yr)− I(U ;Ye)
]
, (2)
in which the auxiliary random variable U satisfies the Markov
relation U → X → (Yr, Ye).
With this, the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity
of the multiple-antenna wiretap channel reduces to evaluating
(2) for the channel model given in (1). This was, however,
open until the work of Khisti and Wornell [4] and Oggier and
Hassibi [5], where they proved that U = X is optimal in
(2). Then, the secrecy capacity (bits per real dimension) is the
solution of the following optimization problem 3 [4]–[6]:
2 The results of this paper is easily extendable to the case where the channel
gains and noises are complex Gaussian random variables and the input is real.
This is due to the fact that, each use of the complex channel can be thought
of as two independent uses of a real additive white Gaussian noise channel,
noting that the noise is independent in the I and Q components [23].
3For a complex channel, the factor 1
2
is dropped as the capacity per complex
dimension is twice as the capacity per real dimension
3max
Q
1
2
[
log det(Inr+HQH
t)− log det(Ine+GQGt)
]
s. t. Q  0,Q = Qt, tr(Q) ≤ P,
(3)
in which the first two constraints are due to the fact that Q
is a covariance matrix and the third constraint is the afore-
mentioned average power constraint. The secrecy capacity is
obviously nonnegative as Q = 0 is a feasible solution of
(3). The above optimization problem is non-convex (except
for nr = ne = 1 [25]) and its objective function possesses
numerous local maxima [8], [10], [26]. As such, a closed-form
solution for the optimum Q is not known, in general.
The problem of characterizing the optimal input covariance
matrix that achieves secrecy capacity subject to a power con-
straint has been under active investigation recently [15]–[17],
[27]. Until recently, the special cases for which the optimal
Q was known were limited to the cases of nr = 1 [14] and
nt = 2, nr = 2, ne = 1 [12].
4 More recently, major steps have
been made in characterizing the optimal covariance matrix.
Fakoorian and Swindlehurst [16] determined conditions under
which the optimal input covariance matrix is full-rank or
rank-deficient. They also fully characterized the optimal Q
when it is full-rank. Very recently, Loyka and Charalambous
[17] found a closed-form solution for the optimal covariance
matrix when the channel is strictly degraded (HHH ≻GHG)
and transmission power is greater than a certain value. The
combination of this result and the unit-rank solution of [4]
gives the optimal Q for the rank-2 case [17]. The optimal
solution is, however, still open in general.
In this paper, we study the MIMO wiretap channel with
nt = 2 while nr and ne are arbitrary integers. We derive
a closed-form solution for the optimal covariance matrix in
this case. Our approach is completely different from that of
[16] and [17]. In addition, unlike [16] and [17], our approach
does not require finding the rank of the optimal covariance
matrix before fully characterizing the solution. It gives the
optimal solution for both full-rank and rank-deficient cases in
one shot. What is more, in [17], it is not clear when the rank of
the optimal solution switches from one to two (i.e., the paper
does not clarify at what power threshold this change of rank
happens); thus, it is not known whether a rank-one solution
or full-rank solution should be applied.
III. A CAPACITY ACHIEVING PRECODING
Based on the optimization problem in (3), a characterization
of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel
is given by non-negative R such that
R ≤ max
Q
1
2
[
log det(Inr+HQH
t)− log det(Ine+GQGt)
]
= max
Q
1
2
log
det(Int+H
tHQ)
det(Int+G
tGQ)
, (4)
4 In these cases, the capacity is obtained by beamforming (i.e., signaling
with rank one covariance) along the direction of the generalized eigenvector
of H and G corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of that pair.
where Q  0,Q = Qt, tr(Q) ≤ P . The equality in (4) is due
to the fact that for any A ∈ Cm×n and B ∈ Cn×m we have
det(Im +AB) = det(In +BA). (5)
Note thatHtH andGtG are nt×nt symmetric matrices. Also,
Q is an nt×nt symmetric matrix and its eigendecomposition
can be written as
Q = VΛVt, (6)
whereV ∈ Rnt×nt is the orthogonal matrix whose ith column
is the ith eigenvector of Q and Λ is the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal elements are the corresponding eigenvalues,
i.e., Λii = λi. In this paper, we study the case where nt = 2
while nr and ne are arbitrary integers.
A. Reformulating the Problem for nt = 2
We simplify the optimization problem (4) for nt = 2 in this
subsection. Since V is orthogonal its columns are orthonormal
and, without loss of generality, we can write
V =
[− sin θ cos θ
cos θ sin θ
]
, (7)
for some θ. Further, let
HtH =
[
h1 h2
h2 h3
]
, GtG =
[
g1 g2
g2 g3
]
. (8)
The following lemma converts the optimization problem (4)
into a more tractable problem.
Lemma 1. For nt = 2 but arbitrary nr and ne, the optimiza-
tion problem in (4) is equivalent to
R ≤ max
λ1+λ2≤P
1
2
log
(
a1 sin 2θ + b1 cos 2θ + c1
a2 sin 2θ + b2 cos 2θ + c2
)
, (9)
in which λ1 and λ2 are nonnegative, and
a1 = (λ2 − λ1)h2, (10a)
b1 =
1
2
(λ1 − λ2)(h3 − h1), (10b)
c1 = 1 +
1
2
(λ1 + λ2)(h1 + h3) + λ1λ2(h1h3 − h22), (10c)
and
a2 = (λ2 − λ1)g2, (11a)
b2 =
1
2
(λ1 − λ2)(g3 − g1), (11b)
c2 = 1 +
1
2
(λ1 + λ2)(g1 + g3) + λ1λ2(g1g3 − g22). (11c)
Proof. To prove this lemma, we simplify the determinants in
(4). First, consider det(Int +H
tHQ). Using Q given in (6)
and applying (5), it is seen that det(Int+H
tHQ) = det(Int+
VtHtHVΛ). Further, it is straightforward to check that
VtHtHV =
[
w1 w2
w2 w3
]
, (12)
in which
w1 = h1 sin
2 θ + h3 cos
2 θ − 2h2 sin θ cos θ, (13a)
w2 = h2(cos
2 θ − sin2 θ) + (h3 − h1) sin θ cos θ, (13b)
w3 = h1 cos
2 θ + h3 sin
2 θ + 2h2 sin θ cos θ. (13c)
4Consequently,
det(Int +H
tHQ) = det(Int +V
tHtHVΛ) (14)
= (1 + λ1w1)(1 + λ2w3)− λ1λ2w22 .
Next, using the basic trigonometric identities
cos 2θ = 2 cos2 θ − 1 = 1− 2 sin2 θ, (15a)
sin 2θ = 2 sin θ cos θ, (15b)
it is straightforward to show that
w1 =
h1 + h3
2
+
h3 − h1
2
cos 2θ − h2 sin 2θ, (16a)
w2 = h2 cos 2θ +
h3 − h1
2
sin 2θ, (16b)
w3 =
h1 + h3
2
− h3 − h1
2
cos 2θ + h2 sin 2θ. (16c)
Substituting (16a)-(16c) in (14), we obtain
det(Int +H
tHQ) = a1 sin 2θ + b1 cos 2θ + c1, (17)
in which a1, b1, and c1 are given in (10). Following similar
steps it is clear that
det(Int +G
tGQ) = a2 sin 2θ + b2 cos 2θ + c2, (18)
where a2, b2, and c2 are given in (11). It should be mentioned
that the constraint λ1 + λ2 ≤ P comes from tr(Q) ≤ P
since, from (6), tr(Q) = tr(VΛVt) = tr(VtVΛ) = tr(Λ).
Note that tr(AB) = tr(BA) and VtV = Int . Also, λ1 ≥ 0
and λ2 ≥ 0 are due to Q  0. This completes the proof of
Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. In the optimization problem given by Lemma 1, the
constraint λ1+λ2 ≤ P can be replaced either by λ1+λ2 = P
or λ1 + λ2 = 0; i.e., it is optimal to use either all available
power or nothing.
Proof. See Appendix A.
B. Optimal Precoding
In what follows, we first find a closed-form solution for the
optimization problem in Lemma 1 for a given pair of λ1 and λ2
that satisfy the constraints. Since log(x) is strictly increasing
in x, we can instead maximize the argument of the logarithm
in (9). Thus, let us define
W =
a1 sin 2θ + b1 cos 2θ + c1
a2 sin 2θ + b2 cos 2θ + c2
. (19)
Then, θ∗ = argmaxW and is obtained by differentiating
W with respect to θ and finding its critical points. It can be
checked that ∂W
∂θ
= 0 is equivalent to
a sin 2θ + b cos 2θ + c = 0, (20)
in which
a = c1b2 − c2b1, (21a)
b = a1c2 − a2c1, (21b)
c = a1b2 − a2b1. (21c)
Before proceeding, we note that W is periodic in θ and its
period is pi. Also, it can be checked that if both a and b are
zero, then a1
a2
= b1
b2
= c1
c2
and W is constant; i.e., any θ is
optimal. Thus, we assume a2 + b2 6= 0. Defining b
a
= tanφ,
(20) can be further simplified as
sin(2θ + φ) +
c√
a2 + b2
= 0. (22)
The critical points of the above equation are given by
2θ =
{
− arctan b
a
− arcsin c√
a2+b2
+ 2kpi
− arctan b
a
+ pi + arcsin c√
a2+b2
+ 2kpi
, (23)
where k is an integer.5 Then, using the second derivative ofW
with respect to θ, we can verify that the first argument gives the
minimum of W while the second one gives its maximum. For
completeness, this is proved in Appendix B. Further, without
loss of optimality, we let k = 0 in (23). Hence, the optimal θ
that maximizes W is obtained by
θ∗ = −1
2
arctan
b
a
+
1
2
arcsin
c√
a2 + b2
+
pi
2
. (24)
Thus far, the optimal θ is obtained for given λ1 and λ2.
To find the optimal λ1 and λ2, in light of Lemma 2, we can
search over all λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0 that satisfy λ1+λ2 = P or
λ1 + λ2 = 0 and maximize (19) where θ is given in (24). We
can vary λ1 from 0 to P . Therefore, we have the following.
Theorem 1. To achieve the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel (with nt = 2) under the average
power constraint P , it suffices to use
V =
[− sin θ cos θ
cos θ sin θ
]
, (25)
as the transmit beamformer with the power allocation matrix
Λ =
[
λ1 0
0 λ2
]
. (26)
An optimal θ is given by (24) and is obtained by searching
over nonnegative λ1 and λ2 that satisfy λ1 + λ2 = P or
λ1 + λ2 = 0 and maximize (19).
Once the optimalV, λ1, and λ2 are determined, these can be
used for precoding and power allocation as illustrated in Fig 2,
similarly to the V-BLAST architecture for communicating over
the MIMO channel [23]. Here, two (nt = 2) independent data
streams are multiplexed in the coordinate system given by
the precoding matrix V. The ith data stream is allocated a
power λi. Each stream is encoded using a capacity-achieving
Gaussian code. The data streams are decoded jointly. When the
orthogonal matrixV and powers λi are chosen as described in
Theorem 1, then we have the capacity-achieving architecture
in Fig 2.6
5It should be highlighted that we always have |c| ≤ √a2 + b2, as otherwise
W would be strictly increasing or strictly decreasing in θ, which is impossible
because W is periodic and continuous.
6It is worth mentioning that we can come up with another orthogonal matrix
U, to express the output in terms of its columns, such that the input/output
relationship is very simple and independent decoding is optimal.
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Fig. 2. Optimal architecture for communicating over the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with nt = 2 and arbitrary nr and ne.
Lemma 3. With a proper choice of θ, the pairs (λ1, λ2) and
(λ2, λ1) result in the same maximum rate in Lemma 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This lemma implies that to find optimal (λ1, λ2) in Theo-
rem 1, it suffices to search for λ1 in [0
P
2 ] rather than [0 P ].
C. Special Cases
The first special case of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap
channel we consider is the MISO Gaussian wiretap channel.
In the following corollary, we prove that a positive capacity
for the MISO case is obtained by signaling with rank one
covariance. This has already been shown in [14] using a
different argument.
Corollary 1. For the MISO Gaussian wiretap channel, The-
orem 1 significantly simplifies and (λ1, λ2) = (0, P ) or
(λ1, λ2) = (0, 0) is the optimal solution. The optimal θ is
then obtained from (24).
Proof. In the case of the MISO multi-eavesdropper wiretap
channel it is known that the rank of the covariance matrix is
either one or zero (see [14, Theorem 2] or [17]). In the latter
case, it is trivial that (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0) is an optimal solution.
In the former case, from Theorem 1 we can see that a rank-
one solution implies that either λ1 or λ2 is equal to zero.
Then, from Lemma 2 we conclude that (λ1, λ2) = (P, 0) or
(λ1, λ2) = (0, P ). But, in view of Lemma 3, we know that
with proper choice of θ these two cases result in the same
maximum rates; thus, one of them can be removed.
Another special case of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel is the case in which the eavesdropper has only one antenna.
Specifically, by setting ne = 1 in Theorem 1 we get
Corollary 2. For the 2-nr-1 Gaussian wiretap channel, op-
timal transmit covariance matrix is at most unit-rank. In
particular, either (λ1, λ2) = (0, P ) or (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0) gives
the optimal solution in Theorem 1.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Corollary 1 and is
omitted. Note that the objective function, in this case, is in the
form of the inverse of that of Corollary 1.
Note that Corollary 1 gives the capacity of 2-nr-1 channels
and thus generalizes the result of [12] for the 2-2-1 channel.
D. Closed-Form Solution for Optimal Power Allocation
Finding optimal λ1 and λ2 in Theorem 1 requires an ex-
haustive search. Although checking a reasonably small number
of (λ1, λ2) is enough in practice,
7 in this subsection we find
a closed-form solution for optimal (λ1, λ2).
We know that ifW ≤ 1 then (λ∗1, λ∗2) = (0, 0) is the optimal
solution. Thus, let us assume W > 1. Then, using Lemma 2,
this implies that λ1+λ2 = P is optimal. Thus, to find optimal
λ1 and λ2, we can solve the following problem:
CMIMOME = max
λ1+λ2=P
1
2
log(W ), (27)
where W = det(Int + H
tHQ)/ det(Int+ G
tGQ) is given
in (4). To this end, we define ah ,
h3−h1
2 , bh , −h2, ch ,
h1+h3
2 , dh ,
√
a2h + b
2
h, and
bh
ah
, tanφh. Then, from (16a)-
(16c) we will have
w1 = ch + dh cos(2θ − φh), (28a)
w2 = dh sin(2θ − φh), (28b)
w3 = ch − dh cos(2θ − φh). (28c)
Now, we can write
Wh = det(Int+H
tHQ)
(a)
= (1 + λ1w1)(1 + λ2w3)− λ1λ2w22
= 1 + λ1w1 + λ2w3 + λ1λ2(w1w3 − w22)
(b)
= 1 + λ1w1 + λ2w3 + λ1λ2(h1h3 − h22)
(c)
= 1 + (λ1+λ2)ch + (λ1−λ2)dh cos(2θ − φh)
+ λ1λ2(h1h3 − h22),
(d)
= 1 + Pch + (2λ1 − P )dh cos(2θ − φh)
+ λ1(P − λ1)(h1h3 − h22)
(e)
= αh + βhλ1 − δhλ21, (29)
in which (a) is due to (14), (b) can be verified using (16a)-
(16c), (c) is due to (28a) and (28c), (d) is due to the fact that
7This is discussed in Section V.
6λ1 + λ2 = P is optimal when W > 1, which follows from
Lemma 2, and (e) is obtained by defining
αh = 1 + Pch − Pdh cos(2θ − φh), (30a)
βh = 2dh cos(2θ − φh) + Pδh, (30b)
δh = h1h3 − h22. (30c)
In a similar way, we can show that
Wg = det(Int+G
tGQ) = αg + βgλ1 − δgλ21, (31)
where
αg = 1 + Pcg − Pdg cos(2θ − φg), (32a)
βg = 2dg cos(2θ − φg) + Pδg, (32b)
δg = g1g3 − g22 , (32c)
and cg, dg , and φg are defined for G similarly to those of H.
Hence, we can write
W =
Wh
Wg
=
αh + βhλ1 − δhλ21
αg + βgλ1 − δgλ21
. (33)
Next, it can be checked that
∂W
∂λ1
=
c¯+ b¯λ1 + a¯λ
2
1
(αg + βgλ1 − δgλ21)2
, (34)
in which
a¯ = δgβh − δhβg, (35a)
b¯ = 2δgαh − 2δhαg, (35b)
c¯ = βhαg − βgαh. (35c)
Let ∆ = b¯2 − 4a¯c¯, and suppose that ∆ > 0.8 Then
λ∗1,1 = (−b¯+
√
∆)/2a¯, (36a)
λ∗1,2 = (−b¯−
√
∆)/2a¯, (36b)
are the roots of (34). Next, it is easy to show that, for λ∗1,i, i ∈
{1, 2}, in (36a) and (36b) we have
∂2W
∂λ21
(λ∗1,i) =
b¯+ 2a¯λ∗1,i
(αg + βgλ1 − δgλ21)2
=


+
√
∆
W 2g
, i = 1
−
√
∆
W 2g
, i = 2
.
(37)
That is, the second derivative is positive at λ∗1,1 and negative at
λ∗1,2. Thus, the former corresponds to a minimum ofW and the
latter corresponds to a maximum of that quantity. Therefore,
the following cases appear:
1) Case I (∆ ≤ 0): This case results in a strictly decreasing
or increasing W in λ1. Then, λ1 = 0 or λ1 = P is optimal,
depending on the sign of a. The optimum value of λ1 can be
inserted into (10) and (11) to find the optimal θ. The optimal
λ2 is obtained from λ1 + λ2 = P .
8 When∆ ≤ 0,W is strictly decreasing or increasing with λ1, and λ1 = 0
or λ1 = P are the only critical points.
2) Case II (∆ > 0): In this case, the maximum of W is
achieved by λ1 = 0, λ1 = P , or λ1 = λ
∗
1,2, provided that
0 ≤ λ∗1,2 ≤ P . The optimal λ2 is obtained from λ1+λ2 = P .
Hence, when W > 1, (λ∗1, λ
∗
2) is one of the following pairs:
(0, P ), (P, 0), or (λ∗1,2, P −λ∗1,2). But, in light of Lemma 3, it
can be seen that (0, P ) and (P, 0) result in the same optimum
W and thus one of them can be omitted.
To summarize, considering all cases forW ≤ 1 andW > 1,
it is enough to check
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (0, 0), (38a)
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (0, P ), (38b)
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = (λ
∗
1,2, P − λ∗1,2), (38c)
in order to obtain the maximum of W . We should highlight
that (38c) will be a choice only if λ∗1,2, defined in (36b), is a
real number between 0 and P . As a result, we have
Theorem 2. The optimal λ1 and λ2 in Theorem 1 is confined
to one of the following cases:
(λ1, λ2) =


(0, 0),
(0, P ),
(λ∗, P − λ∗),
, (39)
in which λ∗ , λ∗1,2 is defined in (36b), and θ is given in (24).
Remark 1. As can be traced from (36b), in general, the optimal
λ1 is a function of θ. On the other hand, the optimal θ, given in
(24), is a function of λ1 (and λ2). Thus, the triplet (λ1, λ2, θ)
can be found for any possible maximizing argument in (39).
Then, by evaluating W for these points we can determine
which one is the optimal (capacity-achieving) solution. For
the first two cases in (39) the solution is obtained analytically.
However, the equation resulting from combining the third case
in (39) and (24) is rather cumbersome and thus we solve it
numerically.
IV. SPECIAL CASES AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
In this section, we briefly consider some special cases of
the proposed precoding as well as possible extensions of this
work.
A. Beamforming for MISO and MIMO Channels
The optimal beamforming provided in the previous section
achieves the capacity of MISO and MIMO channels without
an eavesdropper (G = 0), as shown below.
1) Capacity of MISO Channels: We know that the capacity
of a MISO channel is given by [23]
CMISO = 1
2
log(1 + ‖h‖2P ), (40)
where h is the channel vector. On the other hand, using (14),
it is straightforward to check that the above rate is achieved by
letting λ1 = P , λ2 = 0, and θ =
pi
2 + α, where tanα ,
√
h3√
h1
.
72) Capacity of MIMO Channels: It can be also checked
that the proposed beamforming and power allocation is
equal to SVD-based beamforming with water-filling for θ =
1
2 tan
−1 bh
ah
and
λ1 = min
{P
2
+
ch
δh
, P
}
, (41a)
λ2 = max
{P
2
− ch
δh
, 0
}
, (41b)
where ah =
h1−h3
2 , bh = h2, ch =
√
a2h + b
2
h, and δh =
h1h1 − h22.
B. Extension to nt > 2
The key idea in this paper is to use the fact that any
orthogonal matrix V is parametrized by a single parameter
θ, as shown in (7). Considering this, in (4), we rewrite the
capacity expression in a way that for any nr and ne (with
nt = 2) the terms H
tH and GtG are 2 × 2 matrices.
Hence, the capacity expression can be represented by three
parameters, two nonnegative powers (λ1 and λ2) and one
angle θ.9 Then, the covariance matrix can be optimized with
elementary trigonometric equations, as shown in Section III.
In the case of nt = 3, the main difficulty is to parametrize the
3×3 orthogonal matrixV with two parameters. Even with this,
it is not guaranteed to get a tractable optimization problem. We
have made some progress towards this goal, but the resulting
optimization problem is rather cumbersome and needs further
simplification. This issue becomes more challenging as nt
increases.
C. Construction of Practical Codes
Although the capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel is well-
studied, construction of practical codes is still a challenging
issue for this channel. Recently, it has been shown in [28] that
a good wiretap code, e.g., a scalar random-binning code [29],
is applicable to the MIMO wiretap channel in conjunction
with a linear encoder and a successive interference cancellation
(SIC) decoder to achieve a rate close to the MIMO wiretap
capacity. However, this approach gives rise to several practical
issues in terms of implementation, such as dithering in the
SIC decoder. Considering this, one direction for future work
would be to find a more practical code construction for MIMO
wiretap channels based on our new design of closed-form
optimal beamforming and power allocation solutions.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illus-
trate the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multi-antenna wiretap
channels using the proposed beamforming method. We also
compare our results with those of GSVD-based beamforming
with equal power (GSVD-EP) and optimal power (GSVD-OP)
9Excluding the case HHH − GHG  0 which results in the trivial
solution (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0), from Lemma 2 we can see that λ1 + λ2 = P .
This implies that the capacity region can be expressed just by two parameters,
i.e., λ1 and θ.
allocation proposed in [4] and [11], respectively. As proved in
Section III, the proposed beamforming method is optimal and
gives the capacity. Numerical results are included here to show
how much gain this optimal method brings when compared
with the existing beamforming and power allocation methods.
It should be highlighted that the rate achieved by GSVD-OP
is equal to or better than that of GSVD-EP, for any H and G.
All simulation results are for 1000 independent realizations
of the channel matricesH andG. The entries of these matrices
are generated by i.i.d. N (0, 1). To get the capacity, we use the
optimal power allocation of Theorem 2. We plot the secrecy
rate versus total average power.
We first consider the case with nt = 2, nr = 2, and ne = 1,
where the eavesdropper has only one antenna. As can be seen
from Fig. 3(a), the capacity-achieving beamforming performs
significantly better than both GSVD-based beamformings. By
doubling the eavesdropper’s number of antennas in Fig. 3(b),
the secrecy capacity nearly halves. Moreover, the rate achieved
by the GSVD-OP becomes very close to that of optimal
method. However, as can be seen in Fig. 3(b), there is still
a small gap between the two methods particularly when P is
small.
We next consider the MISO wiretap channel in Fig. 4. It can
be seen that there is a visible gap between the proposed beam-
forming and GSVD-based beamforming. Note that GSVD-EP
and GSVD-OP have exactly the same performance for MISO
wiretap channels. This is because there is only one beam
and all power is allocated to that. A general trend was seen
both for MISO and MIMO wiretap channels is that as SNR
increases the performance of GSVD-EP, and thus GSVD-OP,
get closer to that of the optimal beamforming scheme derived
in this paper. This is not surprising knowing that GSVD-
EP is asymptotically optimal; i.e., it is capacity-achieving as
P →∞ [4].
Figure 5 demonstrates the effect of increasing the number
of antennas at the eavesdropper. All curves in this figure are
for nt = 2, nr = 4 but a different number of eavesdropper
antennas, as depicted on each curve. Note that ne = 0 refers to
the case where there is no eavesdropper; this curve is basically
the capacity of MIMO channel.10 Once the eavesdropper
comes in play (ne ≥ 1), the extent to which information
can be secured over the air reduces. The gap between each
curve and the curve corresponding to ne = 0 is the unsecured
information. Unfortunately, for ne = 16, and thus ne > 16,
no information can be secured via physical layer techniques.
This is because the eavesdropper can no longer be degraded
by beamforming in this situation.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a linear precoding scheme to achieve
the capacity of Gaussian multi-antenna wiretap channels in
which the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper have arbitrary
10Recall from Section IV-A2 that the proposed precoding for the MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel reduces to the well-known SVD precoding of the
MIMO channel (G = 0), and is capacity-achieving.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel (achieved by the proposed beamforming method) and the secrecy rate
of GSVD-based beamforming with equal and optimal power allocations for (a) nt = 2, nr = 2, ne = 1 (b) nt = 2, nr = 2, ne = 2.
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Fig. 4. The secrecy capacity of the MISO wiretap channel and the secrecy
rate of GSVD-based beamforming for nt = 2, nr = 1, and ne = 2.
numbers of antennas but the transmitter has two antennas.
We have reformulated the problem of determining the secrecy
capacity into a tractable form and solved this new problem to
find the corresponding optimal precoding and power allocation
schemes. Our investigation leads to a computable capacity
with reasonably small complexity. The gap between the se-
crecy rate achieved by the proposed precoding and GSVD-
based beamforming can be remarkably high depending on
the antenna configurations. When the legitimate receiver or
eavesdropper has a single antenna, the optimal transmission
scheme is unit-rank, i.e., beamforming is optimal. Further,
in the absence of the eavesdropper, the proposed precoding
reduces to the capacity-achieving scheme of the MIMO/MISO
channels. Hence, it can be used for these channels with/without
an eavesdropper.
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Fig. 5. The secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel for
various ne, with nt = 2, and nr = 4.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. Consider the optimization problem in (3). The secrecy
capacity is zero if HtH −GtG  0 [5]. In this case, it is
clear that (λ1, λ2) = (0, 0) is optimal. Otherwise, the secrecy
capacity is strictly positive [5] and λ1 + λ2 = P is optimal.
This completes the proof since the optimization problem in
Lemma 1 is a different representation of (3).
APPENDIX B
To prove that the first (second) argument in (23) corresponds
to the minimum (maximum), it suffices to show that the second
derivative of W is positive for the first argument and negative
for the second one. Let β , arcsin c√
a2+b2
and recall that
9β ∈ [−pi2 pi2 ]. Then, form (23), the critical points are given by
θ1 and θ2 where
θ1 , −1
2
φ− 1
2
β + kpi, (42a)
θ2 , −1
2
φ+
1
2
pi +
1
2
β + kpi. (42b)
Further, from (19)-(22), we know that
∂W
∂θ
=
sin(2θ + φ) + sinβ
(a2 sin 2θ + b2 cos 2θ + c2)2
. (43)
Then, at θ2 we have
∂2W
∂θ2
(θ = θ2) =
2 cos(2θ2 + φ)
(a2 sin 2θ2 + b2 cos 2θ2 + c2)2
=
−2 cosβ
(a2 sin 2θ2 + b2 cos 2θ2 + c2)2
≤ 0, (44)
since β ∈ [−pi2 pi2 ]. Similarly, we can prove that ∂
2W
∂θ2
(θ1) ≥ 0.
Thus, θ1 and θ2 minimize and maximize W , respectively.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
To prove this, suppose (λ1, λ2) maximizes (19) for some θ
∗
given by (24). Then, from (10) and (11), it is easy to check that
(λ2, λ1) results in the same W for θ = θ
∗ + pi/2. Therefore,
(λ2, λ1) can achieve the same rate as (λ1, λ2) does.
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